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Abstract
Although low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) bear 75%
of the cancer burden globally, their available resources to treat
cancer constitute less than 5% of global health resources. This
inequity makes it imperative to take appropriate measures to
treat and prevent cancer in LMICs, which should include
consideration of trade and patent policies. This article
highlights some impediments to effective use of existing
policies to promote access to treatment and prevention
measures in LMICs and offers recommendations about next
steps.
Introduction
Cancer incidence is rising globally, resulting in financial, physical, and
emotional distress to families and burdening public health services. According
to the World Health Organization (WHO), the global cancer burden was
estimated to have risen from 14.1 million new cases in 2012 to 18.1 million
new cases in 2018 and from 8.2 million deaths in 2012 to 9.6 million deaths
in 2018.1 Low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) bear 75% of cancer
deaths.2 Asia and Africa, for example, have a higher proportion of cancer
deaths (7.3% and 57.3%, respectively) compared to their incidence (5.8% and
48.4%, respectively) than other countries due, in part, to enormous inequities
in cancer treatment.3 Indeed, the available resources to treat cancer in LMICs
compose less than 5% of the global share of resources for cancer control.4
Correspondingly, only 10% of children diagnosed with cancer in LMICs are
cured compared with more than 80% of such children in high-income
countries.4 A WHO finding that less than 30% of low-income countries report
having treatment services available compared to more than 90% of highincome countries underscores the enormous inequities in cancer treatment
and access to cancer medications.5 These disparities make it critical to focus
cancer control efforts on LMICs.
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In these countries, many new cancer medications are exorbitantly expensive
relative to individual income. For example, one company’s egregious original
price tag of Rs 280 428 per month (about $5000 at that time) for sorafenib
tosylate, a drug for treating primary kidney cancer and advanced liver cancer,
was nearly 5 times higher than the median annual income in India.6 Like this
drug, many cancer drugs are unaffordable for large number of patients
diagnosed with cancer in poorer nations.
Efforts to effectively improve access to medicines by reducing costs of cancer
medications should look to international trade agreements and, particularly,
TRIPS flexibilities for compulsory license (explained below), which can (and
should) be used to address health burdens, such as the HIV/AIDS epidemic.
Just as in the case of an epidemic, efforts to address cancer should be mindful
of the labor and economic loss that ensue when productive individuals are
lost to disease. In order to be involved effectively in such efforts, the medical
community must appreciate how international trade and patent prescriptions
intersect with efforts to improve access to cancer medication, especially in
LMICs where such access remains inadequate. The focus of this essay,
therefore, is on how international patent law can help mitigate the cancer
burden in LMICs.
Global Trade Policies and Cancer
The inclusion of intellectual property (hereafter, IP) within the global trade
framework7 was a defining moment for global access to medication. In broad
terms, IP rights are legal tools designed to result in public benefit by
promoting private rights. Thus, IP rights recognize innovations by awarding
monopoly rights to the creator as a means to incentivize creativity. In 1995,
when the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS agreement),8 which forms a part of the larger World Trade
Organization (WTO),9 became effective, it required all member states to
provide a 20-year term of protection for all pharmaceutical innovations. The
TRIPS agreement provided limited flexibilities for countries to weigh IP rights
against public health and developmental needs.8 Specifically, Article 31 of the
TRIPS agreement allows for compulsory license, a mechanism that permits a
third party to produce a patented product or process without the consent of
the patent owner. The patent owner still retains the right to the patent and
receives royalties for the products made under the compulsory licence.
However, this provision allows a sovereign government to authorize the
licensing of a patent to produce a generic version of the drug, enabling greater
access to it during a public health crisis.
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Nevertheless, the inadequacies of the compulsory license during global public
health crises—particularly the HIV/AIDS crisis—forced member states to
adopt, in 2001, the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health. The Doha Declaration affirms the right of member states to
implement policies to enable access to medicines to address a national public
health crisis.10 Thus, Article 31 of the TRIPS agreement in conjunction with the
Doha Declaration reaffirms the rights of sovereign nations to “protect public
health and enhance access to medicines.”11 Importantly, while the Doha
Declaration reaffirmed member countries’ ability to compulsorily license a
patent for the production of generic drugs to address a public health crisis, it
underscored the existence of member countries that are unable to take
advantage of the compulsory license because they lack the manufacturing
capabilities to even produce generic medications. Hence, the WTO General
Council, in 2005, adopted Article 31(bis),12 which allows for export of generic
drugs from member countries that can produce licensed medication to
member countries that lack manufacturing facilities but need the medication.
Through this provision, the TRIPS agreement allows nations to act either
individually or as a regional group in granting compulsory licenses to export
pharmaceutical products to member countries with insufficient or no
manufacturing capacities. However, the definition of what constitutes a
national public health crisis has remained contentious.13
To date, there has been limited use of compulsory licenses for cancer drugs. In
fact, only 2 countries have issued compulsory licenses for cancer treatment to
reduce the cost of medication. India’s first (and so far only) compulsory license
was for sorafenib, a drug to treat kidney cancer,14 and Thailand granted
compulsory licenses over 3 cancer medications: erlotinib (for small cell lung
cancer), letrozole (for early breast cancer) and docetaxel (for breast cancer).15
Both countries cited the high cost of the patented drugs as the reason for
issuing compulsory licenses to improve access to these medicines in their
patient population.16
Despite their limited use, compulsory licenses in these countries were hugely
contentious.17 Specifically, both countries were unilaterally targeted by the
United States through the Special 301 process, which identifies nations
whose domestic IP laws and policies are perceived as creating market access
barriers to US business interests. As a result, India and Thailand have featured
in the Priority Watch Lists compiled annually by the Office of the US Trade
Representative under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 for having
instituted legitimate health safeguards.18 Unilateral US actions have been on
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shaky legal grounds because the trade regime only provides for multilateral
dispute settlement. That the United States, as a rule, unilaterally forces trade
concessions from countries using negotiated flexibilities to alleviate a public
health crisis has resulted in interventions by the WHO and the United
Nations19 in favor of countries that lack the same bargaining power as the
United States. Nevertheless, US actions have made countries hesitant to use
compulsory licenses to increase access by lowering the cost of cancer
medications.20
Notwithstanding the TRIPS agreement’s provision for compulsory licenses,
other impediments from patent policies have stymied efforts to provide
access to medication. Some examples of pharmaceutical patent-related
impediments include evergreening21 and the cost and use of public funds to
create private property.22 Additionally, barriers to competition from follow-on
products during the postpatent period include provisions for data and market
exclusivity for clinical trial data and provisions that act as a barrier to national
interventions.23 The following section discusses 2 issues that most affect
access to cancer medications: data and market exclusivity provisions that
affect national interventions (eg, preventive measures).
Patents and Cancer Prevention
One of the important policy barriers to addressing cancer inequities concerns
provisions for data exclusivity. Data exclusivity protects clinical trial data for a
given period of time. Typically, the clinical trial data submitted by the
innovator drug company is protected by separate data and market exclusivity
periods that run parallel with the patent protection term.24 During the term
when data exclusivity prevails, competing generic drug companies cannot rely
on clinical trial data to get approval for follow-on products. Thus, the data
cannot be submitted to gain approval for a generic drug from the US Food and
Drug Administration (FDA). During the term of market exclusivity, the FDA
accepts applications but does not grant market approval for a generic
manufacturer’s drug, thus ensuring additional monopoly protections for the
drug. Thus, data and market exclusivities work as an additional layer of
protection over patents.
For manufacturers of innovator pharmaceuticals, protection of clinical trial
data provides an additional economic opportunity in that it creates a new
market for the clinical trial data. In the United States, a biologics drug that is
important for treating cancer or autoimmune diseases, for example, can
benefit from 20 years of patent protection and an additional 4 years of data
exclusivity and 8 years of market exclusivity, resulting in a guarantee of a total
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of 12 years of market exclusivity,25,26 and the FDA grants new chemical
entities a total data exclusivity period of up to 5 years.27 The European Union
currently allows 8 years of data exclusivity for the originator’s preclinical and
clinical test data.28 Pharmaceutical companies have slowly increased the
period of data exclusivity, however. In the United States, in addition to data
and market exclusivity, there is paediatric exclusivity that runs for 6 months
and an orphan drug exclusivity that runs for 7 years.29 In fact, the United
States had sought to extend exclusivity for data in its bilateral and regional
agreements. For example, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement,
sought a 10-year data exclusivity for new biologics, which would have
represented an increase in the term of exclusivity for Mexico and Canada,30
although the final text approved on December 13, 2019, does not include the
10-year exclusivity requirement.”31
Importantly, extended data exclusivity periods may effectively provide market
exclusivity for compounds that fail patent scrutiny and thus help maintain
high pharmaceutical prices because even when a patent is declared invalid,
access to data is unavailable for generics. So, if Company A has a drug whose
active ingredient is found unpatentable, the drug falls into the public domain
and hence should be available to the generic drug manufacturer.
Nevertheless, on account of data exclusivity laws, the generic drug company
will be prevented from using the clinical trial data to have its drug approved.
Indirectly, this restriction results in awarding Company A market exclusivity
even though it does not have any innovation in the market. Thus, with
expensive medications such as cancer drugs, data exclusivity delays the entry
of generic drugs into the market until the data protection period is over, and it
indirectly allows the innovator pharmaceutical company to monopolize the
market for even off-patent materials.
Conflict Between Global Trade and Cancer
A recent dispute under the WTO’s dispute settlement process involving
several nations highlights the intersection between patents and trademarks
as well as the importance of domestic interventions to efficiently preserve
public health. In the Australia plain packaging case,32 several countries
disputed Australia’s plain packaging laws. The law required that tobacco
products not use logos, brand name, imagery, or promotional text on their
packaging. The objective was to standardize the appearance of the packets to
reduce the appeal of tobacco products and thereby prevent health
consequences from smoking. The law is part of Australia’s national
comprehensive strategy to improve public health by reducing the use of, and
exposure to, tobacco products. The complaining countries claimed that the
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plain packaging requirements restricted trade and violated key aspects of the
TRIPS agreement—particularly, the companies’ ability to protect and
promote their trademarks. The complaint was that, in restricting the use of
trademarks to preserve public health, Australia interfered with the IPs of the
complainants. The WTO panel found that plain packaging requirements can
and do make a meaningful contribution to Australia’s objective of curbing
tobacco use and exposure in order to prevent cancer despite its violation of
trademark rights.32 The panel reiterated the importance of taking preventive
measures to protect humans and prevent public health risks, given the
extensive evidence of smoking as a key contributor to lung cancer.32
The Australian law provides a useful model for other countries interested in
instituting such preventive measures. In fact, in 2016, the United Kingdom
(UK) statutorily imposed plain packaging for tobacco products. The law came
into force when the Supreme Court of the UK refused to consider an appeal by
the tobacco industry against the law.33 This case sheds light on how LMICs
could align domestic public health objectives with emerging multilateral public
health policies in the area of cancer prevention as well as cancer treatment.
Conclusion
The past decade’s trade and patent policies have largely turned access to
medication in LMICs into a luxury. Effective interventions for cancer treatment
and prevention are thus needed in LMICs to reduce both human and financial
costs of the cancer burden. Such interventions necessitate strategic
policymaking and the inclusion of TRIPS flexibilities in proposed national
legislation to enable the legislation’s passage and efficient implementation.
Although the inclusion of flexibilities in the TRIPS agreement has led to
increased access to cancer medications, data and market exclusivity
continues to pose impediments to access. It is therefore imperative that
policies to prevent and treat cancer employ many-pronged approaches, which
should involve both the medical and the trade community. Importantly, the
medical community’s interest in treating and preventing cancer should inform
the global trade agenda. As interventions employed to tackle HIV/AIDS have
shown, concerted and coordinated policy interventions can lead to desired
results. The same should hold true for cancer. The bottom line is that the
increased global incidence of cancer cries out for improved access to
medications for cancer prevention and treatment.
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